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Mapping Political Regime Typologies
Abstract: The research field of regime theory has seen a proliferation of different approaches and
typologies to explain the ever-changing reality. This paper has created a typology of these regime
typologies and their respective datasets in order to describe and analyze their various merits for research.
Finally this paper maps various typologies according to their most common research areas. The aim is to
maximize the application potential each of specific typology, highlight their limits and aid scholars in
their selection of typologies for qualitative or quantitative research in order to get a better understanding
of democratization processes or regime theories.
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W
hile most researchers have been focusing on democracy and democratiza-
tion, one cannot forget that many parts of the word and a huge chunk of the
global population still live under authoritarian rule. One should bear in mind that
the in-depth research on other regimes started surprisingly late for the discipline
of comparative politics. The works of Hannah Arendt on totalitarianism, Robert
Dahl’s Polyarchy and Juan Linz’s typology to separate democracies from non-de-
mocracies were very influential contributions in the 1960–1970s. As the third
wave of democracy in the 1990s seemed to reach global proportions and succeed
to diffuse the practice of elections as the only recognized form of legitimization
around the world, researchers’ susceptibility for the phenomenon of ‘elections
without democracy’ resulted in the ground-breaking work of Steven Levitsky
and Lucan Way to once more, break open the dichotomous approach toward po-
litical regimes and voice the need of clear concepts and typologies for further
analysis.
Their echo did not go unheard: In response to the growing amount of authoritarian
regimes with a democratic façade (once labeled as ‘democracies with adjectives’ by
Levitsky and Way), scholars developed new classifications and typologies in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. And, in addition, they built up enormous datasets of countries
with various time frames and different scopes with the aim to apply and test their new
typologies.
This paper will portrait a typology of existing typologies and briefly discuss some re-
cent examples of them from the literature. Its aim is to analyze the merits and limitations
for the study and classification of authoritarian regimes, and hopefully aid scholars in
their selection of typologies for qualitative or quantitative research in order to get a better
understanding of democratization processes or regime theories.
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A typology of regime typologies
In order to analyze political regimes in general and autocratic ones in particular, it
would be frowned upon if the author did not provide a (workable) definition of what con-
stitutes a ‘political regime’. For this purpose, this paper relies heavily on the work of
S. Skaaning, who identified four defining properties of different regime types. By com-
paring ten definitions of regimes, Skaaning points out that any definition of political re-
gimes should encompass the group’s access to political power, the way they structure the
interaction in the political power center (horizontal relation: the relationship between the
executive, legislative and judicative powers) and its relations with the broader society
(vertical relation: method of access to the principal political posts). Finally, the fourth ele-
ment is the character of the ruler(s), which allows us to differentiate between autocratic
and democratic regimes and their behavior (Skaaning, 2006, p. 13–14; Van den Bosch,
2013).
Skaaning de facto created a meta-definition of a political regime. By detangling the
existing conceptual origins of existing definitions, he provides a framework in which all
these definitions can be redefined in order to check their accuracy. Even today, scholars
do not use one definition and as every typology is created according to their own defini-
tion, Skaaning’s meta-approach allows us to compare various regime typologies.
Summarizing Skaaning, a definition of regimes should sound as follows: A political
regime designates the institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules iden-
tifying the political power holders (character of the possessor(s) of ultimate decisional
sovereignty) and it also regulates the appointments to the main political posts (extension
and character of political rights) as well as the vertical limitations (extension and charac-
ter of civil liberties) and horizontal limitations on the exercise of political power (exten-
sion and character of division of powers – control and autonomy) (Skaaning, 2006, p. 15).
Regime typologies then should (ideally) be able to divide different types so they may
reach beyond a clear and parsimonious description of their characteristics to classify
cases (Elman, 2005). They should identify and order typical characteristics of regimes in
such a way that differences and shifts on the four defining treats identified by Skaaning
((in)formal rules, attribution of main political posts, vertical and horizontal limitations)
can be observed and are meaningful in explaining regime behavior. Only then can hy-
potheses and theories based on these typologies be tried and tested.
Table 1. shows two broad different approaches for measuring regime types (fami-
lies), with subtypes for categorical typologies (levels). The most commonly used stud-
ies have been added as examples. The first question of this research paper is then: If all
typologies have a different focus, how does one know for what studies a typology can
be used beyond the research of their initial conception? As Cheibub et al. already
pointed out:
“We believe that existing measures of political regimes are significantly different in ter-
ms of both their theoretical grounding and operationalization and, for this reason,
should not be treated as interchangeable. […] In our view, we should take the differen-
ces across measures more seriously and evaluate them in terms of whether they (1) se-
rve to address important research questions, (2) can be interpreted meaningfully, and
(3) are reproducible” (Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009, p. 2).
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Table 1
A typology of typologies of authoritarian regimes
CONTINUOUS
Dichotomous
CATEGORICAL
Trichotomous Polychotomous
Cutright (1963) Sartori (1987) Gasiorowski (1996) Linz & Stepan (1996)
Freedom House (2010) Alvarez et al. (1996) Mainwaring et al. (2007) Hadenius & Teorell (2010)
Polity (2010) Boix et al. (2012) Schedler (2010) Geddes et al. (2013)
Cheibub et al. (2010) Levitsky & Way (2010) Kailitz 2013
In order to answer this question, the author presents a typology of regime
typologies. The aim of this paper is to present the reader with the merits of each
typology and highlight their limits by stating some pitfalls for which these different
classifications should not be used. The purpose of this is not to criticize the authors of
these typologies, nor to select a favorite one that should be used for all kinds of re-
search. This paper aims to make some recommendations on what typologies to choose
for which research by mapping them amongst the most common research fields linked
with democratization.
The examples of different types that are listed in table 1. are not comprehensive or
complete. They have been chosen according to their reputation (recurrence and wide-
spread use) within the literature and time of publication. All the examples are illustrative
for the given sort of typology and a closer analysis of them will help to understand the
merits and limitations of each family as a whole and its respective levels in particular.
This paper will briefly describe two representative examples of each type (marked in bold
in the table 1.) in order to clarify the explanatory potential of each sort typology and will
summarize its findings in the conclusion.
The first family are those typologies that use a continuous measure of ‘demo-
craticness’. The second kind encompasses regime types that have been defined according
to certain categories. The number of analytical categories explains the variation in levels.
What is important here is that these ‘family-subtypes’ do not only formally differ accord-
ing to a degree (the number of categories), but that they inherently possess different char-
acteristics, focal points and potentials.
Continuous measures
This article will start with those typologies that use a continuous measure of democ-
racy. The two most famous examples are listed: Freedom House (FH) is an organization
that classifies all independent countries according to the twin dimension of civil and po-
litical rights. Every country is listed on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being absolutely free
and 7 absolutely not free. Later the scale was divided into three sectors: free (1–2.5),
partly free (3–5) and not free (5.5–7).
Polity then has a similar purpose in measuring democracy, although a different scale
(from –10 (absolutely authoritarian) to +10 (completely democratic)). As countries are
placed on this scale and switch between regimes with arbitrarily cut-off points: autocra-
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cies (–10 to –7), “incoherent polities” or “anocracies” (–6 to +6),1 and democracies (+7 to
+10); there are some serious doubts as to which level these ‘classifications’ can and
should be used to create regime typologies.
Also, in the case of typologies that cover authoritarian regimes, the use of arbitrary
thresholds to distinguish between regimes is a very dangerous thing: These typologies have
been criticized in the literature because it is generally impossible to interpret a country’s
movement across a particular cut-off point in a substantive way (Boix, Miller, 2012, p. 6).
M. Boogaards takes a firm stance when quoting K. Bollen & R. Jackman and G. Sartori:
“If one takes the notion that “democracy is always a matter of degree” to its logical
extreme, then ‘it is meaningless to claim that democracy was inaugurated in a given co-
untry on a single date’ […]. Scholars who conceive of democracy as a matter of degree
treat democracy and its absence as endpoints of a continuum, on which any thresholds
or boundaries are arbitrary. Such ‘degreeism’ […] not only does away with the notion of
a democratic transition, but it also negates the concept of regime and regime type.”2
Regarding FH, Cheibub et al. highlight its non-transparent and arbitrary aggregation
rules. They argue that FH is in essence not a continuous scale or an ordinal ranking, but at
best a categorical variable, where its various categories can be arrived at through billions
of possible combinations (Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009, p. 9). Polity, on the other hand, is
transparent and provides its coding criteria. Gleditsch and Ward argue that its data are in
essence categorical, but that the categories are not precise. The biggest criticism on both
datasets is that they do not give valid arguments on their choice of coding rules (FH do not
even provide them at all!), that the weight attributed to this or that rule is completely arbi-
trary (though Polity made efforts to improve their reliability over the years) and finally
that they code criteria, whose measurement has nothing to do with the concept of democ-
racy. For instance, Polity codes ‘the absence of political violence’ as an important factor
of democratization, while this characteristic is alien to almost all definitions of democ-
racy (Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009, p. 9–11).
Of course, this critique does not render these ‘measures of democracy’ useless for
comparative politics. On the contrary, both measurements (and the extensive datasets that
accompany them) are amongst the most used in the literature. Their strength lies in the
fact that they measure ‘democraticness’,3 that is: they are able to capture to which degree
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1 The concept of anocracy uses weakness and instability as specific, defining characteristics. For the
author this is not enough to classify anocracy as a separate regime. If we compare its qualities with the
definition of a political regime there are not enough definitive treats to classify it separately. When a de-
mocratic regime loses its capability to accommodate conflicts, is unable to prevent violent outbreaks and
is pressured to give in to unelected parties it is not an anocracy, but a ‘weak democracy’, unable to
uphold neither civil rights nor the rule of law. In the other direction, when an autocracy is no longer able
to maintain its dominant position and must share power with other parties we call this a ‘weak autocracy’
(Van den Bosch, 2013).
2 See: K. Bollen, R. Jackman, Democracy, stability, and dichotomies, “American Sociological
Review” 1989, vol. 54, no. 4, p. 615 and G. Sartori,Comparing andmiscomparing, “Journal of Theoreti-
cal Politics” 1991, vol. 3. Quote from Boogaards, 2010, p. 476.
3 Cheibub et al. however question to what degree FH (and Polity) can correctly estimate some of its
coding criteria, claiming that from their personal experience the data they require are hard, if not impo-
ssible, to obtain (see: Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009, p. 11).
countries or regimes are shifting on the horizontal and vertical axes, as part of the defini-
tion of democracy, created by Skaaning. By checking the relation, the checks and bal-
ances between legislative, executive and the judiciary branch; and the levels of freedom
(that is political and civic rights) that the people living under a certain regime enjoy, these
measurements give one measurement for all regimes. As stated above, this measurement
might put too much weight on some variables and ignore others, it might contain mistakes
in its coding, but it still is a measure, which is repeated for almost all countries. In defense
of the quality of FH and other continuous measures, A. Schedler once wrote: “In its as-
sessments of political rights, Freedom House asks more questions than we need, yet still
asks the right questions, in order to judge the democratic quality of electoral processes.”
(Schedler, 2006, p. 10) Despite their methodological opaque and disputed coding criteria,
their output has been reliable, and the position of countries on their scale has been ac-
cepted by most authors.
These datasets have been proven enormously helpful to assess the (un-)democratic
level of different countries; especially over large time spans. This makes it possible to
map their trajectory4 toward or away from democracy. They also can assess if regimes
have been backsliding or improving their human rights record and in which time frame.
Nonetheless, users of these datasets must realize that their ‘degree of democracy’ does
not capture fundamental qualitative differences between political regimes apparently ex-
hibiting the same degree of democratization (Kailitz, 2013, p. 39). Also, if one believes
that democracy can be measured over all regimes, one has to be prepared to argue that
even dictatorships inhibit (low but) positive levels of democracy (Cheibub, Ghandi,
2009, p. 12). Howerver, such measurements make explanatory qualitative analysis very
difficult, if not impossible, and creating seemingly categorical classifications based on
these democratic scales is a pitfall to be avoided at all cost.
A regime typology, which uses categorical definitions to compound concepts that are
structured as types along one or more dimensions, has the potential to go beyond descrip-
tion or classification and does enable some qualitative explanations about regime behav-
ior. Therefore, this kind of typology can be used for testing theories and hypotheses. This
paper will argue that categorizing these various typologies in their ‘own’ typology is not
the result of some arbitrary formal differences between types, but has been done accord-
ing to their choice of level of analysis and the impact of such decisions on comparative
research.
Dichotomous measures
While all the four sorts of typologies contribute to similar research fields, they focus
on different defining characteristics of Skaaning’s interpretation of political regimes, and
in the end they aim to explain disparate phenomena. Among categorical typologies, the
dichotomous ones have been developed over time as the most robust and reliable classifi-
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4 The author especially uses the concept ‘trajectory’ instead of ‘road’ or ‘path’ as these conceptions
are all more semantically loaded with a certain teleology. In this case ‘trajectory’ leaves (by association)
more room for detours, setbacks and obstacles than the latter.
cations. Although one has to take into account that the mechanization of coding rules has
only been possible by stripping the complicated concept of democracy to its bare essence.
In result, these typologies all end up using a minimalistic definition of democracy.
One of the first questions that arise in the context of comparing dichotomous typologies
is to what degree they differ? They only classify regimes in autocracies or democracies.
So their datasets may vary in scope and range (number of countries and years covered),
but the basic definition of which is what should be nearly identical for these classifica-
tions. In answer Boix, Miller & Rosato firmly state:
“Political scientists have devised dozens of distinct measures of democracy and theori-
zed in dozens of other articles on the proper measurement of democracy and the short-
comings of existing approaches. Furthermore, the differences are not merely academic.
Empirical results can depend on the specific measure of democracy used […] and the
period covered […].” (Boix, Miller, 2012, p. 4)
Despite the fact that these typologies (almost) all use a minimalistic definition of de-
mocracy, their results differ considerably because they adapt their definition (and in con-
sequence, coding rules) to their research design (especially their scope and range). The
issue becomes very clear if one compares the typologies (and datasets) of Boix et al. with
Cheibub et al. Both examples are arbitrarily picked, although both works are recent and
known.
Cheibub et al. analyze democratic regimes in the tradition of M. Alvarez and
A. Przeworski. Their definition sounds as follows:
“Democracies are regimes in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of
contested elections. This definition has two main parts: ‘offices’ and ‘contestation’. For
a regime to be democratic, both the chief executive office and the legislative body must
be filled by elections. Contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some
chance of winning office as a consequence of elections.” (Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009, p. 3)
Based on the work of Przeworski, the element of electoral contestation is defined by
ex ante uncertainty, ex post irreversibility (the results cannot be undone after the elec-
tion), and repeatability, which means that such elections are held at recurring and known
intervals. To be classified as a democracy, a political regime must meet all the following
four requirements: (1) The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by
a body that was itself popularly elected. (2) The legislature must be popularly elected.
(3) There must be more than one party competing in the elections. (4) An alternation in
power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must
have taken place (Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009, p. 3).
The weak link in the chain of this coding system is the repeatability of the elections
process. What about leaders that come to power through democratic elections, but after-
wards become more authoritarian? Or another issue: What if a party is so popular and be-
comes reelected over and over again, directly challenging the criterion of repeatability?
Cheibub et al. admit that the “implementation of the last rule is more complicated since it
requires that we make one assumption and one decision about what kind of error we are
willing to accept.” (Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009, p. 4). Of course, they monitor these cases, but
as some of them are observationally equivalent, their classification remains impossible
without introducing subjectivity into the coding process. To successfully classify cases,
they will have to bide their time and wait for an alternation in future elections. The bias is
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greatest in post-Soviet states, where the ruling party has stayed in power despite the intro-
duction of regular elections (Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009).
In defense of their minimal definition, Cheibub et al. state that: “(O)ne should con-
sider the primary purpose for the categorization of political regimes: the conduct of em-
pirical research. In this regard, a measure of democracy based on a minimalist conception,
is compatible with most of the theoretical issues that animate empirical research on politi-
cal regimes.” And: “If democracy requires civil liberties, political rights, freedom of the
press, and other freedoms, then inquiries about the connection between democracy and
such freedoms are also precluded.” (Cheibub, Ghandi, 2009, p. 6–7).
The argument that the more elements included in a definition of democracy, the
greater the difficulties for coding datasets and the less applicable or robust a typology be-
comes, is a valid one and should not be disregarded. The geographic scale and time frame
of the datasets created through these dichotomous typologies are impressive, going back
to centuries with almost a global reach. It is a pity that a minimalistic definition precludes
(some) error, but in exchange offers the most extensive datasets, with the most robustly
empirically tested criteria.
Of course, even within the dichotomous sort differences remain: If one compares
Cheibub et al. with C. Boix, M. Miller and S. Rosato’s typology, one sees that even the
slightest alternation in the minimum definition can have remarkable differences. Boix et
al. encompass all four (see above) characteristics of Cheibub et al. in two main rules.
What they classify under contestation are: (1) The executive is directly or indirectly
elected in popular elections and is responsible either directly to voters or to a legislature.
(2) The legislature (or the executive if elected directly) is chosen in free and fair elections
(Boix, Miller, 2012, p. 8).
In their coding, they likewise use the concept of electoral turnover, based on the works
of Przeworski. Only, they developed a mechanism to overcome the problem of Cheibub
et al., namely their ‘human’ intervention in the coding criteria to classify dubious cases:
By checking “the history of those cases with no electoral turnover for a sufficiently long
period of time (over two electoral terms) to examine whether internal coups, external in-
terventions, abuses of state power, or reports of fraud could explain the prolonged con-
trol of the executive by the same party. If there were none and we observed contested
elections, we coded the period as having free and fair elections. If a peaceful govern-
mental turnover was observed, we applied the same check to determine how far back in
time the condition of free and fair elections applied.” (Boix, Miller, 2012, p. 9)
The slight alteration to the minimal definition however is their choice of adding the rule
that ‘a majority of adult men has the right to vote.’ By including coding for suffrage, they
involve a new, easily verifiable rule that does cause a landslide in their empirical results
compared to other typologies, which ignore this dimension. The difference is most notice-
able for observations prior to World War II. The authors admit that opting for (imple-
mented) male suffrage and not the universal right to vote is an arbitrary choice and serves to
avoid loss of information (especially for observations during the first wave of democratiza-
tion). In their defense they do state that the rule of male suffrage is a flexible threshold,
which can be altered by other scholars to fit their research (Boix, Miller, 2012, p. 10–11).
A dichotomous approach, however robust it may be, still conceals at lot of informa-
tion. What about authoritarian regimes that democratize over time? Should the basic
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cut-off point that divides regimes always be free elections? The impressive datasets,
which accompany these typologies, might be crucial to take on historical research to ex-
pose correlations with structural factors (and how these have changed over time in rela-
tion to democracy), but these typologies remain completely blind to any variations
between different authoritarian regimes, and therefore cannot be used to study them
in depth.
Such typologies, however, serve to break open the black box of the state in order to
identify and explain differences in policy and performance among states: to check the dif-
ferences in long-term economic performance, analyze the distribution of public goods,
the link between regime behavior and international trading norms, variation in foreign
policy, to compare states on their entry into and performance in war, to explain differ-
ences in equality between societies, etc. The extensive datasets then, make robust hypoth-
eses possible. However, these dichotomous measures do not go beyond the first
dimension identified by Skaaning, which is the ‘character’ of the regime.
Trichotomous measures
As mentioned in the introduction, the end of the Cold War blew a new wind through
regime theories. The work of S. Levitsky & L. Way (L&W) as the basis for this specific
kind of typology has also been indispensible. L&W aimed to create conceptual clarifica-
tion among the ‘democracies with adjectives’ that is, the terminology to describe failed or
incomplete transitions to democracy during the third wave. They were the first to identify
and work out an innovative new typology that could capture this new reality. Authoritar-
ian regimes with elections did exist before the Cold War of course, but were very few in
number and therefore often overlooked or misclassified. After 1989 these regimes prolif-
erated on a global scale.
Trichotomous typologies consider a certain regime type that possesses characteristics
of both democracies and autocracies as a separate type: a hybrid regime. L&W added
a new defining characteristic to distinguish between democracies and those authoritarian
regimes that imitate the former by allowing free, fair and competitive elections; full adult
suffrage; providing the broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech
and association; and do not possess interfering ‘tutelary’ bodies (Levitksy, Way, 2010,
p. 6). In order to filter out the democratic façades, the authors added the category of
‘a level playing field’:
“Obviously, a degree of incumbent advantage – in the form of patronage jobs, pork-bar-
rel spending, clientelist social policies, and privileged access to media and finance
– exists in all democracies. In democracies, however, these advantages do not seriously
undermine the opposition’s capacity to compete. When incumbent manipulation of sta-
te institutions and resources is so excessive and on-sided that it seriously limits political
competition, it is incompatible with democracy.” (Levitksy, Way, 2010, p. 6)
Without the addition of this fifth category, these hybrid regimes would not pop up on
the radar and be classified as democracies, even though many scholars would be able to
point out intuitively there is something dodgy about them. Thanks to L&W, the concept
has been integrated fully in the field of comparative politics and regime theories. This
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does not mean however, that all researchers decided to frame the category of hybrid re-
gimes in the same way as its creators. Examples are manifold and as this paper does only
describe examples for illustrative purposes, only the approach of A. Schedler will be
brought up here.
Schedler’s concept of ‘Electoral authoritarianism’ is much broader than Levitsky
& Way’s ‘Competitive authoritarianism’. For Schedler, the presence of free elections and
especially the opening of civil society, which allows organized dissidence in the form of
multiparty competition, is already meaningful enough to separate these regimes from
their closed authoritarian counterparts (Schedler, 2006, p. 5–6). L&W on the other hand,
distinguish between competitive and hegemonic regimes. The former has meaningful
competition and even while the playing field is not fair, the outcome of elections is uncer-
tain. Elites in these regimes do ‘sweat’ when the votes are being counted. In the latter,
democratic institutions only exist on paper, but elections are so “marred by repression,
candidate restrictions, and/or fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome.”
(Levitksy, Way, 2010, p. 6–7). Schedler’s concept of electoral authoritarianism covers
both concepts (Schedler, 2006). In both cases, and many others not discussed in this pa-
per, the authors bring up arguments to treat these regimes as a separate type, even when its
boundaries are defined differently. Their individual arguments are cases in point to de-
fend the existence of a group of trichotomous categories.
A very clear overview of these two concepts (and others) has been presented in the
map of the current field of regime types by L. Gilbert and P. Mohseni. Figure 1. shows
how Schedler’s concept covers both Levitsky & Way’s ‘competitive authoritarian type,’
but also includes regimes marred by such uncompetitive elections, whose outcomes are
not uncertain (hegemonic electoral authoritarian). While Gilbert & Mohseni’s efforts to
map these different definitions to achieve a better understanding of the murky conceptual
waters that ebb and flood between democracy and full autocracy, can only be praised, the
author of this article argues against their recommendation to re-define ‘electoral re-
gimes’. Gilbert & Mohseni argue that only those regime types that hold competitive mul-
tiparty elections possess enough particular characteristics to exhibit different behavior,
and in return only those regimes merit the title ‘electoral regimes’ or hybrid regimes. As
their need for conceptual clarification is understandable, this paper argues that all tri-
chotomous classifications have their merits, depending on the research they focus on.
The family of trichotomous typologies focuses on how the introduction or presence of
elections affects regimes and their behavior. Most of them perform research on the bulk
of these hybrid regimes and their prospects for democratization. There exists a certain
level of consent in the literature that this regime type is the most common stepping stone
to democracy, especially the competitive one identified by L&W.5 To stick with this ex-
ample and the one of Schedler; it is useful to have research available that focuses on the
same broad phenomenon (the level of political competition in political regimes) by using
different typologies. While L&W focus on the influence of ‘uncertainty’ of electoral out-
comes and its effects on regime behavior, Schedler analyzes the broader impact of the
presence of elections in political regimes. Dependent on the research, all the authors
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5 Hadenius & Teorell provide quantitative proof of this thesis (Hadenius, Teorell, 2007).
should use an existing typology that suits their unit of analysis best or develop one if the
former is lacking.
Polychotomous measures
The last groups of typologies are those that use a pluralistic approach to classify politi-
cal regimes. Their categories tend to be more complicated, their datasets less robust and
less universal in scale, and in general they favor the study of autocratic regimes. It is diffi-
cult and time consuming to create large datasets based on these typologies, mostly be-
cause of lack of data on regimes prior to the Second World War. Among all typologies
their classification criteria are most often disputed and usually designed for specific re-
search ends.
Despite their different analytical lenses, these typologies usually aim to provide ex-
planations on all four dimensions. They assess a regime’s character, based on its formal
and informal rules, identify different nexuses of power that interact with each other
(a royal dynasty, the army, the dominating party, opposition groups), and explain various
forms of behavior based on these internal dynamics. They frequently present meaning-
ful classifications that allow them to explain differences on the horizontal and vertical
dimension.
For illustrative purposes, this paper will briefly compare the typology devised by
Geddes et al. with the one of Hadenius & Teorell. As the latter was first heavily inspired
by the former, and since afterwards Geddes updated her model to include monarchies like
in Hadenius & Teorell; both models are similar and mostly differ on one dimension: The
‘who rules?’ question. The research of Geddes et al. focuses on the behavior and lifespan
of the executive in different autocracies. Therefore, their main question is: Who executes
power? From what group are the political leaders? Hadenius & Teorell seek a similar an-
swer, but pose the question differently in order to assess, which regimes should democra-
tize easier: What group possesses the nexus of power to rule the state? Who pulls
the strings?
Once more, two slightly different typologies, each with its own dataset led to roughly
similar outcomes. Both are very useful for their own unit of analysis, but are not inter-
changeable. Geddes et al. for instance, do not take into account the presence of elections
and therefore are not able to analyze its impact on democratization or regime behavior.
Hadenius & Teorell on the other hand, do not focus on leadership and their typology can-
not attribute any relevance of personalist rule to regime theory.
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Closed
Authoritarian
Hegemonic
electoral
authoritarian
Competitive
authoritarian
(Levitsky & Way)
Electoral
democracy
Liberal
democracy
Electoral authoritarianism
(Schedler)
Adapted conceptual map of
the current field of regime
types. (Source: Gilbert,
Mohseni, 2011, p. 275)
Table 2
Regime typologies and their merits
Family Level Main question Main focus* Main explanations
Categorical Dichotomous How can we classify the
behavior of states?
Character – Explaining (foreign) policy or
performance by breaking open
the black box of the state.
Trichotomous How do elections affect
regimes and their be-
havior?
Character,
Horizontal
Vertical
– Democratization of states and
political systems from within.
Polychotomous How does the internal
constellation affect regi-
mes and their behavior?
Character
Who rules?
Horizontal
Vertical
– Duration of regimes.
– Impact of leadership.
– Tolerance vis-à-vis opposition
and dissent.
– Resistance to democratization
by external and internal actors.
Continuous – What is the level of fre-
edom?
Horizontal
Vertical
– Democratization of countries
over time. (Alarm bell)
– Human rights record of regimes
*Main focus according to Skaaning’s 4 defining characteristics of regimes:
– Character of the regime – The institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules identifying the
political power holders.
– Who rules? – Regulation of the appointments to the main political posts.
– Vertical limitations – Extension and character of civil liberties.
– Horizontal limitations – Extension and character of division of powers.
Source: Skaaning, 2006; Boix, Miller, 2012.
Table 2. gives an overview of all forms of typologies, their main focus according
to Skaaning’s definition and their usual field of explanation. As the table above shows,
every family of typologies highlights some dimensions while ignoring others. The author
argues that instead of selecting only one typology and accepting its limits, researches
could focus on the omitted aspects and find a typology that is complementary to address
the issue in detail.
Moreover, Skaaning’s four
dimensions can be extrapolated
into six research areas that to-
gether encompass the focus of
regime theory and democratiza-
tion studies. As figure 2 below
shows: Dichotomous typolog-
ies (A) address the general
character of regimes albeit in
a zero-sum way and provide
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Figure 2. A map of regime typo-
logies
some analytical tools on how to assess elections. Trichotomous approaches (B) cover
a broader research area by also focusing on the nature of opposition parties and the level
playing field (civil society).
Continuous measures (D) provide great insight into the level playing field (elections,
civil society) and give detailed ranking on the various levels of freedom present in a given
regime. They, however, lack the categorical qualities to set an exact threshold and make
a clear distinction between democracy and authoritarianism. Finally, polychotomous
typologies (C) cover the whole spectrum, but do concentrate on the distribution of power
in particular, which regulates the relations of regimes vis-à-vis other elements of the map.
As they offer such a broad analytical framework, general explanations become difficult
as scholars cannot assess which elements (opposition parties, elections, civil society, etc.)
are the most salient for specific outcomes, besides the distribution of power.
The author hopes that by mapping regime typologies, he could provide a modest con-
tribution to aid scholars of regime theories in reflecting on the limits of their chosen
framework and for selecting typologies according to their research area.
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Odwzorowanie polityczne typologii re¿imu
Streszczenie
W dziedzinie badañ poœwiêconych teorii re¿imów wystêpuje znaczne zró¿nicowanie podejœæ oraz
typologii stawiaj¹cych sobie za cel wyjaœnienie dynamicznie zmieniaj¹cej siê rzeczywistoœci. Zamie-
rzeniem autora niniejszego artyku³u by³o zaproponowanie w³asnej typologii obejmuj¹cej istniej¹ce ju¿
typologie, co z kolei pos³u¿y³o do opisania i analizy wartoœci badawczej tych¿e typologii oraz powi¹za-
nych z nimi baz danych. Pozwoli³o to na wskazanie relacji miêdzy opisanymi typologiami i okreœlenie
ich miejsca we w³aœciwych im polach badawczych. Celem tego dzia³ania jest dokonanie refleksji nad
PP 4 ’14 Mapping Political Regime Typologies 123
stosowalnoœci¹ poszczególnych typologii, pokazanie ich ograniczeñ oraz u³atwienie wyboru miêdzy
nimi badaczom zajmuj¹cym siê analiz¹ procesów demokratycznych oraz teori¹ re¿imów politycznych,
z zastosowaniem zarówno jakoœciowych, jak i iloœciowych metod badawczych.
S³owa kluczowe: re¿imy polityczne, typologie, pomiary demokratyzacji, metody badawcze
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